Should Native Workers Welcome Foreign Workers in Upturns ? by Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj & Rose Skaksen, Jan
ÿkonomi- og 
Erhvervsministeriets
enhed for erhvervs-
¯konomisk forskning 
og analyse      
D i s c u s s i o n  P a p e r
Should Native Workers Welcome
Foreign Workers in Upturns ? 
 
Niko la j  Ma lchow-Møl le r  
Jan Rose Skaksen
2008-12
2008-12
Centre for 
Economic and 
Business Research
Should Native Workers Welcome Foreign
Workers in Upturns?∗
Nikolaj Malchow-Møller1,2
and
Jan Rose Skaksen1,3
1Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR),
Copenhagen Business School.
2 Department of Business and Economics,
University of Southern Denmark
3 Department of Economics,
Copenhagen Business School
June 20, 2008
Abstract
In this paper, we show that the welfare implications of immigra-
tion which takes place in upturns, and may be partly reversed in
downturns, are very diﬀerent from the implications of immigration
usually found in static models. Abstracting from any gains to capital
owners and native workers due to complementarities, we find that (es-
pecially temporary) immigration may still benefit native workers in a
European type of labour market where minimum wages may bind in
downturns. However, in the presence of hiring costs, these eﬀects may
be reversed. Thus, promoting temporary immigration schemes may
lead to adverse consequences if they also increase the costs of hiring
foreign labour.
∗This paper is part of a joint project between CEBR and the Rockwool Foundation
Research Unit. We are grateful to the Rockwool Foundation for the financial support for
this project.
1
1 Introduction
This paper considers the welfare implications for host countries of immigra-
tion that takes place in economic upturns, and which may be partly reversed
in downturns.
Host countries are often reluctant to liberalise immigration flows; see,
e.g., Boeri and Brücker (2005) and Hatton (2007). One reason for this is
that it is widely believed that workers in host countries lose on an inflow of
foreign workers. A number of theoretical results support this belief. Winters
et al. (2003) show that there are very big world wide gains from liberalising
international mobility of labour, but these gains mainly go to the immigrants
themselves. Capital owners in host countries also gain, but the workers in
the host countries lose from liberalising migration. Similar results are found
in Borjas (1999) and Boeri and Brücker (2005). Empirically, Borjas (2003)
and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) also find that domestic workers on average
lose from increased immigration.1
The analyses in Borjas (1999), Winters et al. (2003), Boeri and Brücker
(2005) and other similar analyses are conducted in static models — or models
without economic fluctuations. Our purpose is to analyse to which extent, the
welfare implications of immigration are diﬀerent when economies are cyclical
and immigration varies over the business cycle. To our knowledge, this has
not been done before, and there are at least two reasons why such an analysis
is interesting. First, immigration has always been — and still very much is
— a phenomenon closely related to business cycles. Already Jerome (1926)
documented a close relationship between US business cycles and inflows of
migrants into the US in the 19th century. But also evidence from the 20th
century supports a strong relationship between job opportunities in receiving
countries and the extent of immigration. A prominent example is the immi-
gration into Western Europe in the period 1955-1973 (Zimmermann, 1995),
but also the recent inflows of workers from Eastern Europe into Ireland, UK
and Scandinavia have at least partly been a consequence of booming host
economies.
Second, explicit temporary immigration programmes may be an alter-
native policy option to permanent immigration permits in host countries.
Prominent examples of such programmes are the Bracero programme which
1There are a number of additional empirical studies on how immigrants aﬀect wages
and/or employment of native workers; see, e.g., Card (2001), Dustmann et al. (2005),
Pischke and Velling (1997), and Angrist and Kugler (2003). There is a lot of variation in
the results but the general conclusion seems to be that immigration has small negative
employment and/or wage implications for native workers; see also Longhi et al. (2005,
2006).
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in the period 1942-64 brought temporary migrants from Mexico to the US
and the Gastarbeiter system of 1955-73 that brought temporary migrants to
Germany; see, e.g., Dustmann (1996) and Hatton (2007).
In this paper, we set up a model of a small open economy with a European
type of labour market (a minimum wage). Within this model, we show that
the welfare implications of immigration which takes place in upturns, and
may be partly reversed in downturns, are very diﬀerent from the implications
of immigration usually found in static models.
We assume away diﬀerences across native workers, and immigrants and
native workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes. Thus, there are no
gains from immigration due to complementarities between native workers
and immigrants. We also leave aside any gains to capital owners by assum-
ing perfect competition among domestic firms. Furthermore, we assume free
international trade in symmetric but diﬀerentiated goods which by construc-
tion induces a negative terms-of-trade eﬀect from immigration.
Thus, we abstract from most of the "traditional" gains from immigration
that have been suggested in the literature, i.e. gains to capital owners and
native workers due to complementarities. Still, we find that immigration
may benefit native workers. The reason is two-fold: First, while immigration
pushes down wages of native workers in upturns, it also raises the incen-
tives for firms to invest in capital which in turn has positive consequences
for native employment in downturns. Second, foreign workers are taxed in
good states but receive unemployment benefits in bad states. While this
asymmetry would typically disfavour native workers as immigrants increase
unemployment relatively more than they increase employment, this eﬀect
may be reversed in the presence of return migration in downturns.
Thus, our results show that business cycles are important for understand-
ing not only the nature of immigration (as argued already by Jerome in 1926)
but also the consequences of immigration for host countries. Without busi-
ness cycles, immigration would unambiguously decrease host country welfare
in our model. However, large business cycles do not in themselves improve
the gains from immigration. We need minimum wages, and (preferably) high
return rates of immigrants in downturns to ensure a positive business cycle
induced eﬀect of immigration in our model.
One interpretation of this is that a binding minimum wage prevents the
labour market from clearing in downturns. Immigration may help alleviating
this ineﬃciency. Although a substantial part of the gain goes to the immi-
grants themselves, the improvement in eﬃciency may be suﬃciently high
that native workers become better oﬀ. Seen in this perspective, our paper
is related to Borjas (2001) who illustrates that immigration may "grease the
wheels of the labour market" if there are rigidities in the responsiveness of the
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native labour supply to diﬀerences in wages across local areas. The idea in
Borjas (2001) is that workers face mobility costs if they are to move from one
local area to another. This implies that native workers are not suﬃciently
mobile to even out regional diﬀerences in wages. New immigrants, on the
other hand, constitute a self-selected group of individuals who have decided
to "pay" the mobility cost associated with immigration but are then free to
settle in any area of the host country. Their choice of locality is, therefore,
very sensitive to local wage diﬀerences. As Borjas (2001) shows, this may
improve eﬃciency in the allocation of workers across local areas compared to
the situation without immigration. Our model shows that immigration may
also improve eﬃciency if the allocation of native workers across time periods
(the business cycle) is ineﬃcient.
Hiring foreign labour is likely to be associated with additional expenses
such as extra search costs or costs of applying for a permission to use foreign
labour. Obviously, such hiring costs may completely eliminate immigration
if they are suﬃciently high. We show that moderate hiring costs typically
dampen the welfare consequences of immigration for native workers. More
surprisingly, we also show that in some cases, hiring costs may completely
reverse any positive consequences associated with immigration causing the
situation with hiring costs to be worse than both the "no immigration" and
the "free immigration" scenarios. The reason for this somewhat counterin-
tuitive result is that hiring costs of immigrants invoke an option value in the
employment of immigrant workers. With hiring costs and business cycles, it
may become optimal to keep the (less productive) immigrants in downturns,
thereby increasing the likelihood of native workers being laid oﬀ.
An interesting policy implication of this is that while temporary immi-
gration schemes may work to increase the benefits to native workers of immi-
gration by fostering more return migration in downturns, they may have the
exact opposite consequences if they also increase the costs associated with
hiring immigrants. This could, for example, happen if they are constructed
in a way which burdens employers with the extra tasks of getting the required
permissions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the
model. The model is solved and results are presented in Section 3. Section
4 concludes. An Appendix with analytical details of the solution and proofs
of propositions is attached at the end.
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2 The Model
We consider a model of a small open economy (the home country), which
interacts with the rest of the world in both goods and labour markets. Specif-
ically, we assume that there is free international trade in n final goods which
are imperfect substitutes in consumption. The home country (country i) pro-
duces only one of the n goods (good i), and this good is produced exclusively
in the home country. Furthermore, the home country can allow immigrants
to enter the domestic labour market. The model is of a partial equilibrium
nature, as we model the equilibrium in the home country taking as given the
world demand for goods, which varies over the business cycle, and the world
supply of labour (potential immigrants).
We assume that there is perfect competition among the firms in the home
country. Firms can either recruit from the domestic labour market or — if
allowed to — from a low-wage foreign labour market (immigrants). At the
domestic labour market, there is an exogenous (competitive) supply of na-
tive labour, but there is also a minimum wage. At the foreign labour market,
the domestic firms face an infinite supply of labour, which is, however, less
productive than domestic labour due to assimilation costs, language barri-
ers, etc.; see, e.g., Dustmann (1999).2 Although foreigners (immigrants) are
willing to supply labour at a very low wage, firms cannot pay less than the
going minimum wage in the home country. Furthermore, the employment of
foreigners may be associated with a hiring cost.
The public sector taxes wage income to finance benefits to unemployed
natives and immigrants in the home country.
2.1 Consumers
Utility of the representative consumer in country i (the home country) is
given by:3
EU = E
Ã ∞X
t=0
(1 + δ)−t ut
!
(1)
2Since our focus is on immigration resulting from firms hiring foreign labour in upturns
where domestic labour is expensive, it seems natural to assume that these immigrants are
less productive than natives — otherwise firms would also hire them in downturns. In prac-
tice some firms would hire some immigrants in downturns due to, e.g., complementarities,
but this is not the type of immigration we want to focus on in this paper.
3Note that we often suppress the subscript i to simplify notation in what follows.
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where δ is the discount rate and ut is the instantaneous utility function which
is assumed to be of the CES form:
ut = n
1
1−ξ
Ã nX
j=1
c
ξ−1
ξ
jt
! ξ
ξ−1
(2)
where cjt is consumption of good j in period t in the home country.
Maximising utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint results
in the following consumption of good j in period t in the home country:
cjt =
µ
pjt
Pt
¶−ξ
1
n
µ
Ct
Pt
¶
(3)
where Ct is the (nominal) amount spent on consumption in period t, and Pt
is the cost of living index given by:
Pt =
Ã
1
n
nX
j=1
p1−ξjt
! 1
1−ξ
(4)
Normalising this index to one, Pt = 1, consumption of good j by the repre-
sentative consumer in the home country is given by:
cjt = p−ξjt
1
nCt (5)
where Ct is now the nominal and real amount spent on consumption in period
t.
As a consequence, instantaneous utility in (2) reduces to ut = Ct and
overall utility of the representative consumer is simply given as the expected
sum of discounted consumption expenditures:
EU = E
Ã ∞X
t=0
(1 + δ)−t Ct
!
(6)
To simplify the dynamics, we assume that the discount rate, δ, is equal to
the real rate of interest, r, in which case the indirect utility function is simply
given by the sum of discounted expected real net income:
EU =
∞X
t=0
(1 + r)−tE (NIt) (7)
where NIt is the real net (after tax) income of the representative consumer
in period t in the home country.
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2.2 Firms
World demand varies over the business cycle. Specifically, in period t, the
demand for good i (the good produced by the home country) is given by:
dit = p−ξit Z
ξ
t or pit = Ztd−θit (8)
where θ = 1/ξ and Zt is a state variable which follows a two-state Markov
process. There is a good state, where Zt = ZG, that persists with probability
PG, and a bad state, where Zt = ZB < ZG, that persists with probability
PB.4
The representative firm in the home country produces according to a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
yt = l1−αt kαt (9)
where yt is output, lt is labour input, and kt is capital used in period t. With
CRTS and perfect competition we can focus on one representative firm.
Eﬀective labour input is given as:
lt = lnt + al
f
t , 0 < a < 1, (10)
where lnt is the employment of natives, and l
f
t is the employment of foreigners
(immigrants). Thus, we assume natives and immigrants to be perfect sub-
stitutes, but a reflects that the productivity (eﬀective labour) of foreigners
is lower than that of natives.
Given the level of capital, variable profits (excluding hiring costs) are
given by:
πt = pityt − wnt lnt − w
f
t lft (11)
where wnt (w
f
t ) is the wage of natives (foreigners) in period t.
Taking all prices as given, the representative firm maximises the expected
discounted cash flow:
v0 = E
Ã ∞X
t=0
(1 + r)−t (πt − φt − ht)
!
(12)
with respect to labour and capital, where φt is the investment cost in period
t and ht is hiring costs of foreign labour in period t.
To simplify the model, we assume away any exogenous separations be-
tween firms and workers and no depreciation of capital. If we further assume
4Note that this demand function is consistent with CES preferences over the n goods
when Zt =
¡Dt
n
¢1/ξ
, where Dt is total world wide expenditures on consumption in period
t.
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that the initial period is a period of high demand, ZG, there will only be
investments in the initial period.5 This implies that the capital costs are
given as:
φ0 = φ · k0, φt = 0 for t > 0 (13)
and kt = k0 for all t > 0. Thus, (12) can be written as:
v0 = E
Ã ∞X
t=0
(1 + r)−t (πt − ht)
!
− φk0 (14)
Since all future (non-investment) good states become identical, and all
future bad states become identical, the values of the representative firm in
future good and bad states are:
vG = πG + 11+r (PGvG + (1− PG) vB)
vB = πB + 11+r
³
PBvB + (1− PB)
³
vG − h · (lfG − lfB)
´´ (15)
where h is the unit cost of hiring foreign workers, and we have used that
lfG ≥ l
f
B, i.e. (additional) foreign labour is only hired when entering an
upturn.
Solving for vG and vB from (15), we get:
vB =
1
N [(1 + r) (1 + r − PG)πB + (1 + r) (1− PB) πG
− (1− PB)h(lfG − l
f
B)
i
(16)
vG =
1
N [(1 + r) (1 + r − PB)πG + (1 + r) (1− PG) πB
− (1− PG) (1− PB)h(lfG − l
f
B)
i
(17)
where
N = (1 + r − PG) (1 + r − PB)− (1− PG) (1− PB) (18)
Since the firm enters the market and invests in a good state (the initial
period), the value of the firm in the investment period is given as:
v0 = vG − h · lfG − φk0 = 0 (19)
where the last equality follows from the free entry of firms in equilibrium.
This last condition implicitly determines the aggregate capital stock, k0,
which can be interpreted as the number (or size) of firms in the economy.
5Note that it would not make any important diﬀerence if we assumed that the first
period was a period of low demand. In that case, the solution would be slightly diﬀerent
in the first periods, but from the first time a period of high demand was encountered, the
solution would be as the one we find above.
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2.3 The Labour Market
The supply of labour by domestic workers in each period is given as L¯n, which
is assumed to be constant. The number of unemployed natives in period t is
thus given as unt = L¯n − lnt .
In upturns, the number of foreign workers present in the home country
equals the number of foreign workers employed, lfn.6 In downturns, the share
ρ of the workers who are fired are assumed to return to their home countries.
This parameter is exogenous, but in practice, it may depend on the exact
formulation of a guest worker programme. It is, however, beyond the scope
of the present paper to model the forces determining return migration — see
Dustmann (1996) for examples of this.
The wages of natives and foreigners can diﬀer in equilibrium, but both
wages have to respect a minimum wage, w¯. For simplicity, we assume that
the minimum wage is fixed, i.e. it is the same in downturns and upturns,
and it is independent of the labour mobility regimes considered below. This
need not be the case in practice, but in order to compare the implications
of diﬀerent policy regimes, it seems natural to compare the implications of
diﬀerent policies in one dimension (labour mobility) — given the policy in
other dimensions (the minimum wage). We are also going to assume that
the wage rate at the foreign labour market is (much) lower than the minimum
wage. Therefore, foreigners always prefer to work at the minimum wage in
the home country compared to the wage in their own country, i.e. there is an
infinite supply of foreign workers at the minimum wage. As a consequence,
foreigners always receive the minimum wage when employed by domestic
firms: wft = w¯, t = G,B.
2.4 The Public Budget
We assume that the public sector collects revenue by levying an income tax,
t, on all employed workers, and for simplicity we assume that public expen-
ditures solely consist of unemployment benefits, b, paid out to unemployed
natives and foreigners. The model can easily be extended to include "other
government expenditures" as well. As far as these "expenditures" are pro-
portional to the population size, there will only be minor changes in our
results. On the other hand, if the expenditures are independent of the size
6One way to ensure this is if all foreign workers who are not employed in subsequent
upturns must return to their home countries. Alternatively, we can assume that the cost
of hiring foreign workers who are already in the country is marginally lower than the costs
of bringing new foreigners to the country. This will imply that all foreign workers present
in the country will be employed first whenever the economy enters an upturn.
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of the population (i.e. "fixed costs"), there will be an increase in the gains
from immigration as this implies that the expenditures per person decrease.
With respect to the public budget, we assume that it should balance
initially. In other words, the expected present value of future budgets should
be zero initially. Furthermore, we do not allow t to vary across periods.7 As
there will only be unemployed foreigners in downturns, this implies:
ΩGt
³
lnGwnG + l
f
Gw
f
G
´
+ΩBt
³
lnBwnB + l
f
Bw
f
B
´
= ΩGbunG +ΩBb(unB + u
f
B) (20)
where:
ΩG =
1 + r − PB
1− PG + 1 + r − PB
(21)
and:
ΩB =
1− PG
1− PG + 1 + r − PB
(22)
ΩG and ΩB are the time discounted long-run proportions of good and bad
states, respectively. As b is exogenous, t is endogenously determined as:
t = ΩGbu
n
G + ΩBb(unB + u
f
B)
ΩG
³
lnGwnG + l
f
Gw
f
G
´
+ ΩB
³
lnBwnB + l
f
Bw
f
B
´ (23)
2.5 Welfare
Since we are going to evaluate the implications of foreign labour flowing into
the home labour market, we will only consider the welfare of natives. As in
the case of firms, since there are only two possible states, the indirect utility
(the value function) of the representative individual can be written as:
EU = 1N [(1 + r) (1 + r − PB)E(NIG) + (1 + r) (1− PG)E(NIB)] (24)
As profits are driven to zero by free entry, the expected net income of the rep-
resentative individual is a weighted sum of wage income and unemployment
benefits:
E (NIt) =
µ
(1− t)wnt
lnt
L¯n + b
unt
L¯n
¶
(25)
where lnt /L¯n and unt /L¯n are the proportions of employed and unemployed
natives, respectively.
7An alternative would be to assume that the expected present value of future public
budgets should always balance. The disadvantage of assuming this is that tax rates are
then going to vary over the business cycle with relatively low tax rates in upturns and rel-
atively high tax rates in downturns. While technically more cumbersome, this alternative
would not lead to qualitatively diﬀerent results.
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3 Results
In this section, we present the results of the model. We are going to consider
three versions of the model. First, the "no immigration" regime where im-
migration is prohibited. Alternatively, we can think of this as a case where
hiring costs are very (infinitely) high, h = ∞. Second, we consider a "free
immigration" regime where hiring costs are absent, h = 0. Finally, we con-
sider the case where hiring costs are positive but finite, 0 < h <∞. We shall
refer to this as the "hiring cost" regime.
Below, we first give the general flavour of how the model is solved while
we relegate most of the analytical details to the Appendix. Then we consider
the implications of opening up the economy to immigration when there are no
costs associated with hiring foreign workers. That is, we compare the cases
of "no immigration" and "free immigration". Finally, in the last subsection,
we consider how the results change in the presence of hiring costs.
3.1 Solving the Model
In solving the model, we first need to determine the firms’ demand for ef-
fective labour. Firms are competitive and labour is supplied inelastically by
domestic workers who are more productive than immigrants and who can be
fired and hired without costs. Hence, the wage of native workers, wnt , will
always equal the prevailing market price of eﬀective labour. This implies that
the demand for eﬀective labour in each period can be found by maximising
the profit function in (11) with respect to eﬀective labour, lt, given the cost
of eﬀective labour, wnt , the price of output, pit, and the capital stock, kt.
This results in:
lt =
∙
wnt
(1− α) pit
¸− 1α
kt, t = G,B (26)
Firm supply can then also be written as a function of the prevailing wage of
native labour, the price of output and the capital stock:
yt = kt
µ
wnt
(1− α) pit
¶− 1−αα
, t = G,B (27)
Setting the supply in (27) equal to the demand from (8), we can express the
production, yt, and the output price, pit, as functions of the wage of native
labour and the capital stock:
pit =
h
Zαt k−αθ0 (wnt )
θ(1−α) (1− α)−θ(1−α)
i 1
1−β , t = G,B (28)
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and:
yt =
h
Z1−αt kα0 (wnt )
−(1−α) (1− α)(1−α)
i 1
1−β , t = G,B (29)
where β = (1− α) (1− θ) and we have used that kt = k0. The resulting
demand for eﬀective labour in each period as a function of the wage of native
labour and the capital stock is then given by inserting (28) into (26):
lt =
Ã
wnt
(1− α)Ztkα(1−θ)0
! 1
β−1
, t = G,B (30)
The second step is then to find the equilibrium in the labour market
in each period. Here we use that labour is supplied inelastically, but that
the equilibrium should respect the minimum wage. The equilibrium will, of
course, depend on the regime considered ("no immigration", "free immigra-
tion" or "hiring costs"). Furthermore, in each regime we must distinguish
between a number of outcomes depending on when and where the minimum
wage binds.8
Finally, in the third step, we insert the resulting equilibrium values of
wages and labour in the zero-profit condition from (19) to solve for the capital
stock, k0. Details of the solutions can be found in the Appendix. In the
following, we focus on the central results.
3.2 Free Immigration versus No Immigration
In this section, we consider the consequences of opening up the economy to
immigration when hiring costs are absent, h = 0. Subscripts "no" and "free"
are used to indicate equilibrium values under "no immigration" and "free
immigration", respectively.
Intuitively, immigrants will only be hired by domestic firms under "free
immigration" if the eﬀective cost of foreign labour, w¯/a, is lower than the
prevailing wage of native workers in good states under "no immigration",
wnG,no. As shown in the appendix, this condition is equivalent to:
w¯
a < (1− α)ZG
¡
L¯n
¢β−1 kα(1−θ)0,no (31)
8For example, in the "no immigration" scenario, we must distinguish between three
possible outcomes: (1) where the minimum wage does not bind in any of the states; (2)
where the minimum wage binds only in bad states; and (3) where the minimum wage binds
in both states. In the "free immigration" scenario, we get even more possible outcomes
as the total demand for eﬀective labour must now be divided across foreign and native
workers. See Appendix for details.
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where k0,no is the capital level under "no immigration". In the remainder of
this section, we shall assume that the condition in (31) is satisfied. If not, the
outcome under "free immigration" will simply be identical to the outcome
under "no immigration".
In general, the eﬀect of immigration on welfare is ambiguous in our model.
Proposition 1 gives the precise condition for getting a welfare gain from
immigration:
Proposition 1 With h = 0, the welfare gain from opening up the economy
to immigration is positive if and only if:
(1 + r − PB)
1− PG
³w¯
a − w
n
G,no
´
L¯n +
¡
lnB,freewnB,free − lnB,nownB,no
¢
+
tfreew¯
∙
lfB,free +
(1 + r − PB)
1− PG
lfG,free
¸
− b (1− ρ)
³
lfG,free − l
f
B,free
´
> 0 (32)
provided that immigration will take place, i.e. (31) is satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To understand why immigration may increase native welfare, it is instruc-
tive to consider each of the terms on the left hand side in (32) in turn. The
first term expresses the loss in native wages in good states from an immi-
grant inflow.9 Immigrants will push down native wages in good states to the
eﬀective cost of foreign labour, w¯/a. Thus, this term is always negative given
that an inflow will occur.
However, firms also invest more as a consequence of the increased labour
supply. These investments in turn implies that the capacity of the economy,
and therefore the marginal productivity of labour, is higher in downturns.
This may have positive consequences for native workers. If a binding mini-
mum wage is causing unemployment in bad states in the "no immigration"
regime, allowing for immigration will push up native employment in bad
states. Since native workers are more productive than foreign workers, firms
will prefer natives in a bad state where the minimum wage is binding. This
eﬀect — which is captured by the second term in (32) — has not been consid-
ered previously in the literature as it only arises in a model where business
cycles are explicitly taken into account.
However, if minimum wages are not binding in bad states in the "no
immigration" regime, immigration may also push down wages in bad states
9The factor (1− r − PB) /(1− PG) expresses the weight of good states relative to bad
states.
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causing a negative wage eﬀect in both states. Hence, the second term in (32)
can be either negative or positive, depending on the level of the minimum
wage.10
The third and fourth terms in (32) represent the fiscal eﬀects. The third
term captures the taxes paid by foreign workers in good and bad states. This
term is always positive, although the contribution from foreigners in bad
states is only positive if they are employed in bad states, i.e. if lfB,free > 0.
Finally, the fourth term is the fiscal loss from paying benefits to unemployed
foreigners in bad states. This term is always negative but depends on the
return rate of immigrants, ρ.11
With a low return rate, the total fiscal eﬀect of immigration is negative
as it increases unemployment in bad states relatively more than it increases
employment in good states. In this case, the sum of the third and fourth
terms in (32) will always be negative. However, with a suﬃciently high return
rate, this asymmetric eﬀect is reversed causing employment (and hence tax
income) in good states to increase relatively more than unemployment (and
hence public expenditures) in bad states. However, depending on parameter
values, we can still have a positive overall welfare eﬀect even with a return
rate of zero.
In sum, assuming that the minimum wage binds for native workers in bad
states, Proposition 1 states that native welfare increases if the value of the
higher native employment in bad states plus the tax income from foreigners
in good states exceed the value of the lower native wage in good states plus
the value of benefits paid to foreigners in bad states. Thus, contrary to the
classical labour market model of immigration, the net eﬀect on welfare in our
model can be positive — even without taking the fiscal consequences — the
third and fourth terms in (32) — into account.
To illustrate these points, columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 contain a numerical
example of the eﬀects of opening up for immigration when the minimum wage
is binding in downturns.12 In the example shown, the minimum wage equals
1.22 which is also the wage paid to native workers in downturns both before
and after immigration. In the lower part of the Table, we have illustrated the
10In fact, there is also a third (and more subtle) possibility, namely that wages of natives
go up in bad states. This happens if the minimum wage is not binding but still high enough
to prevent employment of foreigners in bad states. See Appendix A.3 for details.
11Note that only tax payments from foreigners aﬀect the welfare condition in Proposition
1. Redistribution among native tax payers and native unemployed does not aﬀect welfare.
Furthermore, labour supply is assumed to be insensitive to the tax system.
12The parameter values used are: θ = 0.1, r = 0.03, ZG = 1.1, ZB = 0.9, PG = PB =
0.7, α = 0.3, a = 0.9, φ = 2, L¯n = 1, ρ = {0, 0.8, 0.95}, b = {0, 0.7}, and w¯ = 1.22
(columns 1 and 2) and w¯ = 1.04 (columns 3 and 4).
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welfare gains for diﬀerent values of the benefit level, b, and the return rate,
ρ. With b = 0, there are no fiscal eﬀects, and the welfare gain is in this case
positive (1.32%) and independent of the return rate, ρ. At a benefit level
of b = 0.7, on the other hand, welfare decreases at low levels of the return
rate while it increases at higher levels. Note also that the increase in welfare
when ρ = 0.95 is higher than the increase in welfare without a fiscal eﬀect
(b = 0), which illustrates that the fiscal gain can be positive in itself at high
return rates.
Table 1: Numerical Examples of Opening Up for Immigration
w¯ = 1.22 w¯ = 1.04
(1) (2) (3) (4)
"no imm" "free imm" "no imm" "free imm"
wnG 1.388 1.356 1.414 1.156
wnB 1.220 1.220 1.157 1.156
unB 17.6% 11.9% 0% 0%
∆EU (b = 0) 1.32% −10.55%
∆EU (b = 0.7, ρ = 0) −2.42% −25.54%
∆EU (b = 0.7, ρ = 0.8) 0.77% −13.55%
∆EU (b = 0.7, ρ = 0.95) 1.36% −11.30%
Note: Remaining parameter values are given in footnote 12.
It follows from the discussion of Proposition 1 that business cycles aﬀect
the potential welfare gains to be realised from immigration. The reason
is that the benefits to the natives from immigration in good states mainly
materialise in bad states. First, there is lower unemployment of natives in
bad states. Second, the taxation of immigrants in good states may contribute
to finance the unemployment benefits to natives in bad states.
In a static version of this model economy (i.e. one where ZG = ZB),
the wage of native workers would simply be pushed down to the eﬀective
cost of foreign labour, w¯/a, whenever immigration occurs. This eﬀect is
reminiscent of the classical labour market eﬀect of immigration which the
empirical literature has focussed on; see, e.g., Borjas (2003) and Aydemir and
Borjas (2007). Furthermore, this negative eﬀect would not be counteracted
by a gain to capital owners due to perfect competition among firms, and
there would be no fiscal gain as we cannot both have unemployed natives
and immigration in the static economy.
Similarly, if the economy is suﬃciently flexible (i.e. no or low minimum
wages), the eﬀects of opening up the economy to immigration are also neg-
ative. This is illustrated in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 above where the
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minimum wage is so low that immigration pushes down native wages in both
good and bad states. This results in a (large) negative eﬀect of immigration,
which can be made smaller, but not positive by low benefit levels and/or
high return rates.13
Thus, in order to achieve a welfare gain from immigration a combination
of business cycles and minimum wages is required. Otherwise, immigration
solely reduces the marginal product of labour in at least one state without
having counteracting (positive) eﬀects in the other state.
Another way to think of this is that the minimum wage creates an ineﬃ-
cient allocation of native labour over the business cycle with unemployment
in downturns but full employment and relatively high wages in upturns. Im-
migration may help address this ineﬃciency by providing a better match
between demand and supply of labour. In this sense, there is some similarity
between the eﬀects from immigration illustrated here and the "immigration
greasing the wheels of the labour market" argument in Borjas (2001). In
Borjas (2001), there is an ineﬃcient allocation of native workers across local
areas due to high mobility costs. Immigration may diminish this eﬃciency
loss, since immigrants prefer to settle in areas where wages are relatively
high.
3.3 Hiring Costs
Above, we assumed that firms were able to hire foreign labour at no extra
cost compared to native workers. In the following, we consider how the
results change when the hiring of immigrants is associated with some cost,
h > 0. Besides being a more realistic scenario as the hiring of foreign labour is
likely to be associated with additional expenses, h may also reflect politically
induced costs such as the cost of applying for a permission to use foreign
labour.
Thus, the case with hiring costs may be interpreted as a situation with
public intervention to prevent free immigration. For example, a potential
policy implication of the previous section was to promote temporary immi-
gration schemes. One possible way of doing this is to condition residence
permits on employment. This may result in increased hiring costs by, e.g.,
burdening employers (explicitly or implicitly) with the extra task of getting
the required permissions.
A substantial hiring cost may, of course, block immigration completely,
yielding the same outcome as in the "no immigration" scenario above. Under
13Note that the fiscal eﬀect can never be positive in this case, as this requires unem-
ployment of native workers.
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some circumstances, however, the introduction of even a small hiring cost
may also eﬀectively block immigration as stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 With hiring costs, h > 0, and if foreigners can move freely
(or just at a lower cost than h) to another firm after immigration, there will
be no immigration.
The result in Proposition 2 follows from the fact that a firm which initially
employs a foreign worker has to pay the hiring cost, h. A firm will only do
so if it is able to pay the foreign worker a wage suﬃciently below his or her
productivity. If other firms are able to employ ("poach") the foreign worker
without paying the full hiring cost, this will not be possible. Hence, there
will be no hiring of foreign workers in the first place.
As a consequence, in the following, we consider the case where hiring costs
are not high enough to block immigration completely and where poaching
of workers by rival firms is not possible. In other words, if a firm in the
host country employs a foreign worker, it has to pay the same hiring cost
irrespectively of whether the foreign worker is already in the country or not.14
Intuitively, the introduction of a hiring cost then increases the eﬀective
cost of foreign labour, which under free immigration was w¯/a. This in turn
limits immigration in good states and hence the negative wage consequences
for native workers who no longer see their wages pushed all the way down to
w¯/a. It also reduces investments in capital compared to the "free immigra-
tion" scenario and hence also limit the potentially positive consequences for
natives in bad states. Similarly, due to the smaller inflow of foreigners, the
fiscal eﬀects also become smaller. Altogether, the introduction of a hiring
cost will thus diminish the welfare eﬀects of opening up for immigration.
However, as shown in the Appendix, there is also another possibility. The
presence of hiring costs may completely reverse the welfare consequences of
opening up for immigration as stated in Proposition 3 below, where the
subscript "hc" indicates the hiring cost regime (h > 0).
Proposition 3 Welfare eﬀects of immigration with hiring costs:
1. There exist a h1 and values of the other parameters such that EUno >
EUhc (h1) > EUfree
2. There exist a h2 and values of the other parameters such that EUfree >
EUhc (h2) > EUno
14Alternatively, one can assume that firms can attempt poaching at some cost, but that
the outcome of the poaching is uncertain.
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3. There exist a h3 and values of the other parameters such that EUfree >
EUno > EUhc (h3)
4. There exist a h4 and values of the other parameters such that EUno >
EUfree > EUhc (h4)
Proof. See Appendix A.4 and examples below.
Cases 1 and 2 are the expected intermediate outcomes. By making foreign
labour more expensive, hiring costs give us a welfare outcome in between
that of "free immigration" and "no immigration". Thus, if welfare under
"no immigration" is higher than under "free immigration", hiring costs can
reduce some of the loss by restricting immigration (Case 1). Similarly, if
welfare is higher under "free immigration", hiring costs reduce some of this
gain (Case 2).
Cases 3 and 4 are more surprising — namely that the presence of hiring
costs can be worse than both the case of "free immigration" and "no immi-
gration". To see why such situations may arise, we must acknowledge that
hiring costs introduce an option value into the model. The presence of hiring
costs create an interdependency between the two periods. As firing costs are
incurred every time a foreign worker is hired, it may be optimal to keep these
workers during downturns in order to save the hiring cost when returning to
a good state. This may be optimal, even though the foreign workers are less
productive than native workers and have to be paid the same (minimum)
wage.
Figure 1 shows two numerical examples of the welfare gain of opening up
for immigration as a function of the hiring cost, h.15 In one of the examples,
the welfare gain is initially positive but decreasing in h. In the other case,
it is initially negative but increasing in h. This illustrates Cases 1 and 2
of Proposition 3. However, as h reaches a certain level (0.4 in this case),
it becomes optimal to keep the foreign workers instead of native workers in
downturns. This causes the welfare gain to drop dramatically in both cases,
illustrating Cases 3 and 4 from Proposition 3.
15The parameter values used are: θ = 0.1, r = 0.03, ZG = 1.2, ZB = 0.8, PG = PB =
0.7, α = 0.3, a = 0.9, φ = 2, L¯n = 1, b = 0.7, w¯ = 1.18, ρ = 0.8 (the upper line) and
ρ = 0.5 (the lower line).
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Figure 1: Hiring Costs and Welfare Gain
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The change in behaviour by firms happens when the hiring costs become
suﬃciently high to make it worthwhile for firms to keep the foreign labour
instead of the native labour in downturns. The exact condition for this is
stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 If parameter values are such that foreigners are hired in good
states and the minimum wage binds for native workers in bad states, the
condition for foreign workers crowding out native workers in bad states is:
w¯ (1− a) > (1− PB)h
1 + r (33)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Intuitively, if the extra cost of using a unit of foreign labour in a bad
state, which is w¯ (1− a), is less than the expected discounted hiring cost
next period, (1− PB)h/ (1 + r), firms will keep all their foreign labour when
they enter a bad state.
In sum, while hiring costs in general dampen the eﬀects of immigration
by making foreign labour more expensive, we have shown that in some cases,
they may induce an "adverse" eﬀect by creating an option value of keeping
the immigrants employed. In that case, the hiring costs may create a regime
inferior to both the "no immigration" and the "free immigration" regimes.
In the previous section, we showed that one way to increase the gains from
immigration was to promote a temporary immigration scheme. The present
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section has shown that if the implementation of such a scheme gives rise to
increased hiring costs for domestic firms, e.g., by resulting in more paper work
for the firms when hiring immigrants, the consequences may become opposite
to those intended. Hence, the overall policy implication is that temporary
migration schemes can increase host country welfare provided that they do
not raise the hiring costs faced by the host country firms.
4 Conclusion
Although it is an empirical fact that immigration often takes place in upturns,
no papers have previously considered how that aﬀects the consequences of
immigration. In this paper, we have shown that such immigration may in
fact benefit native workers — even if it puts downward pressure on wages to
native workers in upturns. There are two reasons for this. First, with immi-
gration, firms invest more as they have access to more and cheaper labour
in upturns. This increases the capacity of the economy — also in downturns
— and, therefore, the unemployment of natives in downturns will be lower.
Second, the incomes earned by immigrants in upturns are taxed, and these
taxes are used to finance public expenses such as unemployment benefits to
natives in downturns. For these eﬀects to dominate the negative eﬀects of
immigration, we need a combination of business cycles and minimum wages,
preferably coupled with high return rates of immigrants in downturns. Hence,
a potential policy implication of this could be that host countries should seek
to promote temporary immigration schemes.
No immigration and free immigration are two "extreme" cases. We also
considered the intermediate case where firms can only hire foreign workers
at a cost. We showed that this typically dampens the consequences of im-
migration. However, it also introduces an option value into the model which
may cause firms to hang on to their foreign workers — instead of their native
workers — in downturns if hiring costs are substantial. In that case, hiring
costs may produce an outcome inferior to both the "free immigration" and
the "no immigration" regimes. This is particularly interesting as the case
with hiring costs may be interpreted as a politically induced situation, e.g.,
by requiring residence permits for foreign workers. It also qualifies the first
policy implication that host countries should seek to promote temporary im-
migration schemes. To be sure that this will benefit native workers such
schemes must not give rise to extra costs for the host country firms.
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A Appendix
In Section A.1 below, we provide a proof of Proposition 1 from Section 3.2 in
the paper. Sections A.2 and A.3 provide detailed analytical solutions for the
"no immigration" regime and the "free immigration" regime, respectively.
These analytical solutions are used for constructing the numerical examples
used in Section 3.2. Finally, Section A.4. contains the analytical details of
the "hiring cost" regime considered in Section 3.3, including a proof of the
propositions in that section.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, it follows from the labour demand function in (30) that the equilibrium
wage to native workers in good states under "no immigration" is given by:
wnt,no = max
³
w¯,
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)Ztkα(1−θ)0,no
´
(34)
where k0,no is the equilibrium capital level under "no immigration". Now, the
eﬀective cost of foreign workers is always w¯/a. It then follows that foreign
workers will be employed (and immigration therefore occur) if and only if:
w¯
a < (1− α)ZG
¡
L¯n
¢β−1 kα(1−θ)0,no (35)
as ZG ≥ ZB. This proves the condition in (31).
Second, assuming that (35) holds, natives will never be unemployed in
good states, unG,no = unG,free = 0 and lnG,no = lnG,free = L¯n. Furthermore, the
wages of natives in good states under "free immigration" will be pushed down
to the eﬀective cost of foreign labour, w¯nG,free = w¯/a, while foreign labour
will always be paid the minimum wage, wfG,free = w
f
B,free = w¯. We can then
use (24) and (25) to write the welfare gain from "free immigration" as:
EUfree − EUno =
(1 + r)
NL¯n
·h
(1 + r − PB)
³
(1− tfree)
w¯
a − (1− tno)w
n
G,no
´
L¯n + (1− PG) ·¡
(1− tfree)wnB,freelnB,free − (1− tno)wnB,nolnB,no + b
¡
lnB,no − lnB,free
¢¢¤
(36)
where taxes, tfree and tno, are given by:
tfree =
b
h
L¯n − lnB,free + (1− ρ)
³
lfG,free − l
f
B,free
´i
(1+r−PB)
(1−PG)
³
L¯n w¯a + l
f
G,freew¯
´
+
³
lnB,freewnB,free + l
f
B,freew¯
´ (37)
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tno =
b
¡
L¯n − lnB,no
¢
(1+r−PB)
(1−PG) L¯
nwnG,no + lnB,nownB,no
(38)
Using these expressions for tfree and tno, we can (after some manipulations)
rewrite the welfare gain as:
EUfree − EUno =
(1 + r)
NL¯n
·
h
(1 + r − PB) L¯n
³w¯
a − w
n
G,no
´
− (1− PG) b (1− ρ)
³
lfG,free − l
f
B,free
´
+ tfreew¯
h
(1− PG) lfB,free + (1 + r − PB) l
f
G,free
i
− (1− PG) lnB,nownB,no + (1− PG) lnB,freewnB,free
¤
(39)
This gain is positive if and only if:
¡
lnB,freewnB,free − lnB,nownB,no
¢
+ tfreew¯
∙
lfB,free +
(1 + r − PB)
1− PG
lfG,free
¸
+
(1 + r − PB)
1− PG
³w¯
a − w
n
G,no
´
L¯n − b (1− ρ)
³
lfG,free − l
f
B,free
´
> 0 (40)
which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.2 The "No Immigration" Regime (not intended for
publication)
This section provides a detailed analytical solution to the "no immigration"
regime. In this case, the demand for eﬀective labour in each period, (30),
translates into a demand for domestic labour. The labour supply function,
on the other hand, has an inverse L-shape as domestic labour is supplied
inelastically but has to respect a minimum wage. From (30) and given the
level of capital, k0,no, the labour market equilibrium in period t is therefore
given by:
wnt,no = max
³
w¯,
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)Ztkα(1−θ)0,no
´
(41)
lnt,no =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
L¯n if w¯ ≤
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)Ztkα(1−θ)0,noµ
w¯
(1−α)Ztkα(1−θ)0,no
¶ 1
β−1
if w¯ >
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)Ztkα(1−θ)0,no
(42)
If the minimum wage exceeds the wage that would prevail in the absence
of a minimum wage,
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)Ztkα(1−θ)0,no , the minimum wage will bind
and there will be unemployment of natives in period t.
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As we have two labour demand functions — one for each state — this
gives us three types of equilibria: Case 1 where the minimum wage does not
bind in any of the states. We can think of this as the situation where both
demand curves cut the labour supply function on its vertical part. Case 2
where the minimum wage only binds in the bad state. This corresponds to
the case where the labour demand function for the bad state intersects the
supply function on its horizontal part but where the demand function for the
good state still cuts the supply function on its vertical part. Finally, case 3
where the minimum wage binds in both states. This is the when the demand
functions both intersect the labour supply function on its horizontal part.
In each case, the level of k0,no is derived from the zero-profit condition in
(19) by inserting the relevant expressions for wnt,no and lnt,no from above into
the expressions for variable profits from (11) together with the expressions
for pit and yit from (28) and (29):
Case 1: If the minimum wage does not bind in bad states (and therefore
not in good states either), i.e. if
w¯ ≤
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,no (43)
then:
wni,no =
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)Zikα(1−θ)0,no and lni,no = L¯n, i = G,B (44)
and inserting the profit expressions in the zero profit condition results in:
k0,no =
∙
(1 + r)αL¯βn
φN [(1 + r − PB)ZG + (1− PG)ZB]
¸ 1
1−α(1−θ)
(45)
Case 2: If the minimum wage binds in the bad state but not in the good,
i.e.: ¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,no < w¯ ≤
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,no (46)
then:
wnG,no =
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,no , lnG,no = L¯n
wnB,no = w¯, lnB,no =
µ
w¯
(1−α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,no
¶ 1
β−1 (47)
and inserting the profit expressions in the zero profit condition gives us:
k0,no =
½∙
(1 + r) (1 + r − PB)
N · φ
¸µ
αZG
¡
L¯n
¢β k−βα(1−θ)1−β0,no ¶
+
(1 + r) (1− PG)
N · ϕ
³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´
Z
1
1−β
B w¯
−β
1−β
¾ 1−β
θ
(48)
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which uniquely defines k0,no.
Case 3: Finally, if the minimum wage binds in both good and bad states:
w¯ >
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,no (49)
then:
wni,no = w¯ and lni,no =
Ã
w¯
(1− α)Zikα(1−θ)0,no
! 1
β−1
, i = G,B (50)
and we get:
k0,no =
∙
(1 + r)
φN (w¯)
−β
1−β
µ
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
¶
µ
(1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G + (1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B
¶¸ 1−β
θ
(51)
Furthermore, the above expressions can be used to derive the critical
values of the minimum wage, w¯, that separate the three cases. The critical
value of w¯ that separates case 1 from case 2 can be found by inserting (45)
in (43) yielding:
w¯crit12,no =
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZB·
∙
(1 + r)αL¯βn
φN [(1 + r − PB)ZG + (1− PG)ZB]
¸ α(1−θ)
1−α(1−θ)
(52)
Similarly, by inserting (51) in (49), we get the critical value of w¯ that sepa-
rates case 2 from case 3:
w¯crit23,no =
³¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZG
´ θ
θ+βα(1−θ) ·
∙
(1 + r)
φN ·
µ
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
¶
µ
(1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G + (1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B
¶¸ (1−β)α(1−θ)
θ+βα(1−θ)
(53)
where w¯crit23,no > w¯crit12,no.
Finally, the tax-level, tno, can be found by inserting into (23) and the
expected utility of a home worker by inserting into (24).
24
A.3 The "Free Immigration" Regime (not intended for
publication)
This section provides a detailed analytical solution for the "free immigration"
regime. Here, we can distinguish four diﬀerent cases. First, if the wage to
native workers in good states with no mobility is less than or equal to the
eﬀective wage of foreigners, w¯/a, there will be no eﬀect of opening up the
economy to immigration. Foreigners will never be hired, and the equilibrium
will be as in the case above. This is our case 4 and happens if:
w¯
a ≥
¡
L¯n
¢β−1 ³
(1− α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,no
´
(54)
where k0,no is the corresponding equilibrium capital level in the "no immi-
gration" regime, given by (45), (48) or (51) above.
If, on the other hand, the eﬀective wage of foreigners, w¯/a, is strictly
smaller than the wage natives received in good states with no immigration:
w¯
a <
¡
L¯n
¢β−1 ³
(1− α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,no
´
(55)
foreigners will be hired when the economy is open for immigration. The
wage of natives in good states will now be pushed down to the eﬀective
wage of foreign labour, w¯/a. Furthermore, foreign labour will satisfy the
excess demand for labour at this wage. Thus, from (30), we get the following
outcomes in good states whenever (55) is satisfied:
wnG,free = w¯a , lnG,free = L¯n
wfG,free = w¯, l
f
G,free =
1
a
Ãµ
w¯
a(1−α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,free
¶ 1
β−1
− L¯n
!
(56)
As foreign labour is less productive than domestic labour (a < 1), firms
will first lay oﬀ foreign workers in downturns. This means that we need to
distinguish between three possible downturn outcomes in the case where (55)
holds: Case 1 where foreigners are also hired in bad states and therefore the
minimum wage does not bind for natives in bad states either. Case 2 where
foreigners are hired only in good states, but the minimum wage still does not
bind for natives in bad states but the eﬀective cost of foreigners is just too
high. Case 3 where foreigners are only hired in good states and where the
minimum wage binds for natives in bad states. As the outcome will influence
the initial capital investment, we shall consider each of these cases in turn.
Case 1: This case requires:
w¯
a <
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,free (57)
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From the labour demand function in (30), we then get:
wnB,free = w¯a , lnB,free = L¯n
wfB,free = w¯, l
f
B,free =
1
a
Ãµ
w¯
a(1−α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,free
¶ 1
β−1
− L¯n
!
(58)
and the capital stock is then derived by use of the zero profit condition in
(19), using that in this case:
πG = piGyG,free −
w¯
a L¯
n − w¯lfG,free (59)
πB = piByB,free −
w¯
a L¯
n − w¯lfB,free (60)
After some manipulations, this results in the following expression for the
initial capital investment:
k0,free =
"
(1 + r) w¯a
−β
1−β
Nφ
µ
(1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G + (1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B
¶
³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´i 1−β
θ
(61)
Case 2 requires:
w¯ ≤
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,free <
w¯
a (62)
From the labour demand function, we then get:
wnB,free =
¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,free , lnB,free = L¯n
wfB,free = w¯, l
f
B,free = 0
(63)
and the capital stock is then derived by use of the zero profit condition, using
that in this case:
πG = piGyG,free −
w¯
a L¯
n − w¯lfG,free (64)
πB = piByB,free − wnB,freeL¯n (65)
which after some manipulations results in the following expression for k0,free:
k0,free =
(1 + r) (1 + r − PB)
φN
³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´
·³w¯
a
´ β
β−1
Z
1
1−β
G k
α(1−θ)
1−β
0,free +
(1 + r) (1− PG)
φN αZB
¡
L¯n
¢β kα(1−θ)0,free (66)
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Note that the above expression determines k0,free indirectly.
Case 3 requires: ¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,free < w¯ (67)
From the labour demand function, we then get:
wnB,free = w¯, lnB,free =
µ
w¯
(1−α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,free
¶ 1
β−1
wfB,free = w¯, l
f
B,free = 0
(68)
The capital stock is then derived by use of the zero profit condition, using
that in this case:
πG = piGyG,free −
w¯
a L¯
n − w¯lfG,free (69)
πB = piByB,free − w¯lnB,free (70)
which results in:
k0,free =
∙
(1 + r)
Nφ
³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´¸ 1−βθ
·"
(1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G
w¯
a
−β
1−β
+ (1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B w¯
−β
1−β
# 1−β
θ
(71)
Furthermore, the above expressions can be used to derive the critical
values of the minimum wage, w¯, that separate the three cases. First, the
critical value that separates case 1 from case 2 can be found by inserting (61)
in (57). This yields:
w¯crit12,free = a
h¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZB
i θ
θ+βα(1−θ) ·
∙
(1 + r)
Nφ
µ
(1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G + (1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B
¶
·³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´i (1−β)α(1−θ)
θ+βα(1−θ)
(72)
Second, the critical value separating cases 2 and 3 can be found by using (71)
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in (67):
w¯crit23,free =
h¡
L¯n
¢β−1
(1− α)ZB
i θ
θ+βα(1−θ) ·
∙
(1 + r)
Nφ
µ
(1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G a
β
1−β + (1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B
¶
·³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´i (1−β)α(1−θ)
θ+βα(1−θ)
(73)
Finally, the tax-level, tfree, can be found by inserting into (23) and the
expected utility of a home worker by inserting into (24).
A.4 The "Hiring Cost" Regime
This section provides the analytical details of the solution in the "hiring cost"
regime, where domestic firms can only hire foreign workers at a cost. While
the demand for eﬀective labour in the two states still follows from (30), where
the native wage rate is the prevailing price of eﬀective labour, the presence
of hiring costs create an interdependency between the two states.
In the following, we shall assume that parameter values are such that: (i)
foreigners are always hired in good states, lfG,hc > 0; and (ii) the minimum
wage binds in bad states. Formally, these conditions require:
wnG,hc <
¡
L¯n
¢β−1 ³
(1− α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,hc
´
(74)
and ¡
L¯n
¢β−1 ³
(1− α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,hc
´
< w¯ (75)
To show the interdependency between the two states, we can use that the
amount of native labour demanded can be expressed as the total demand for
eﬀective labour less the eﬀective amount of foreign labour demanded:
lnt,hc = lt,hc − al
f
t,hc, t = G,B (76)
Then we can write variable profits (excluding hiring costs) in good and bad
states as:
πG,hc = piG,hcyG,hc − wnG,hclG,hc +
¡
awnG,hc − w¯
¢
lfG,hc
πB,hc = piB,hcyB,hc − w¯lB,hc − (w¯ − aw¯)lfB,hc
(77)
The last term in the expression for πG,hc is the amount saved by using foreign
labour instead of native labour in good states, whereas the last term in the
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second line is the extra cost of using foreign labour instead of native labour
in bad states.
Without hiring costs, the last term in πG,hc would be zero as the wage to
native workers would be pushed down to w¯/a whenever immigration takes
place. Hence, there would be no gain from using immigrants instead of
natives in good states — only losses in bad states as w¯ > aw¯. With hiring
costs, however, the wage of native workers in good states is not pushed down
to w¯/a, as the eﬀective cost of foreign labour now includes the hiring cost.
The expected discounted cash flow, v0, can be expressed as:
v0,hc =
1
N
h
(1 + r) (1 + r − PB)
n
piG,hcyG,hc − wnG,hclG,hc +
¡
awnG,hc − w¯
¢
lfG,hc
o
+ (1 + r) (1− PG)
n
piB,hcyB,hc − w¯lB,hc − w¯(1− a)lfB,hc
o
− (1− PG) (1− PB) h(lfG,hc − l
f
B,hc)
i
− h · lfG,hc − ck0,hc (78)
Given wages, wnG,hc and w¯, and the total demand for eﬀective labour by
firms, lG,hc and lB,hc, we can use the above expression to find the part of that
demand which is a demand for foreign labour, lfG,hc and l
f
B,hc.
First, in good states, the amount of foreign labour used is determined by
the diﬀerence between the total demand for eﬀective labour, lG,hc, and the
available native labour, L¯n. Second, given the amount of foreign labour used
in good states, lfG,hc, we can diﬀerentiate v0,hc with respect to the amount of
foreign labour used in bad states, lfB,hc:
∂v0,hc
∂lfB,hc
¯¯¯¯
¯
lfB,hc<l
f
G,hc
=
1− PG
N [− (1 + r) w¯(1− a) + (1− PB) h] (79)
Note that in the case without hiring costs (h = 0), the right hand side is
always non-positive, implying that lfB,hc = 0 is the optimal choice (as we have
assumed that the minimum wage binds in bad states). With hiring costs,
however, things are diﬀerent. As long as lfB,hc < l
f
G,hc, there are two eﬀects
of raising lfB,hc. First, it increases the wage costs in bad states, as foreigners
must be paid the same wage as natives but are less productive. This is the
first term in the square brackets above. Second, it reduces hiring costs when
the economy returns to a good state. This is the second term. It follows
from this expression that the optimal amount of foreign labour in bad states
is given as:
lfB,hc =
(
0 if w¯ (1− a) > (1−PB)h
1+r
lfG,hc if w¯ (1− a) <
(1−PB)h
1+r
(80)
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which proves Proposition 4. Intuitively, if the extra cost of using foreign
labour in a bad state, w¯ (1− a), is less than the expected discounted hiring
cost next period, (1− PB) h/ (1 + r), firms will keep all their foreign labour
when they enter a bad state, lfB,hc = l
f
G,hc. This defines two separate subcases:
Case 1, where foreigners are fired in downturns, and case 2, where they are
kept in downturns.
Now, the wage of native workers in good states, wnG,hc, must adjust to
ensure that all native workers are employed in good states. The condition
for this is that ∂v0,hc/∂lfG,hc = 0. That is, there must be no extra benefit of
hiring an extra foreign worker at the expense of a native worker in a good
state. This condition gives us the equilibrium wage for native workers for
each of the two subcases:
wnG,hc =
(
w¯
a +
Nh+(1−PB)(1−PG)h
(1+r)(1+r−PB)a if w¯ (1− a) >
(1−PB)h
1+r
w¯
a +
Nh+(1+r)(1−PG)w¯(1−a)
(1+r)(1+r−PB)a if w¯ (1− a) <
(1−PB)h
1+r
(81)
Thus, with hiring costs, wnG,hc exceeds w¯/a. In case 1, where foreigners are
fired in downturns, the wage of natives is raised by the repeated costs of
hiring alternative foreign workers. In case 2, where foreigners are fired, the
wage of natives in good states is raised by the value of the initial hiring cost
plus the cost of keeping the foreign workers in bad states. Note also that the
case of free immigration is a special case of case 1, where h = 0.
Labour inputs can then be derived from (30) and (76). In good states,
the inputs of natives and foreigners are:
lnG,hc = L¯n
lfG,hc = 1a
Ã∙
wnG,hc
(1−α)ZGkα(1−θ)0,hc
¸ 1
β−1
− L¯n
!
(82)
In bad states, we need to distinguish between the two cases. In Case 1:
lnB,hc =
µ
w¯
(1−α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,hc
¶ 1
β−1
lfB,hc = 0
(83)
whereas in Case 2:
lnB,hc =
µ
w¯
(1−α)ZBkα(1−θ)0,hc
¶ 1
β−1
− alfG,hc
lfB,hc = l
f
G,hc
(84)
assuming that not all natives are crowded out in downturns.
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The equilibrium capital level is determined as in the previous sections
using the zero-profit condition:
k0,hc =
∙
(1 + r)
Nc
³
(1− α)
β
1−β − (1− α)
1
1−β
´¸ 1−βθ
·
∙
(1− PG)Z
1
1−β
B w¯
−β
1−β + (1 + r − PB)Z
1
1−β
G
¡
wnG,hc
¢ −β
1−β
¸ 1−β
θ
(85)
where wnG,hc is given by (81).
Finally, the tax-level, thc, can be found by inserting into (23) and the
expected utility of a home worker by inserting into (24). Using these to
construct the example in Figure 1 completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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